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ABSTRACT




Kenneth May [16], in 1952, characterized simple majority rule in terms of
three conditions: anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness. In this thesis,
we remove the condition of neutrality and obtain a characterization of the class of
voting rules that satisfy anonymity and positive responsiveness. The key concept
in this characterization is the notion of a strong quota pair system. The situation
with two alternatives studied by May can be thought of as a very simple example of
a finite median semilattice. The main result of this thesis is an extension of May’s
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In 1952, Kenneth May gave an elegant characterization of simple majority
decision on two alternatives [16]. This represents the classic notion of deciding be-
tween exactly two candidates by declaring as the winner the candidate who receives
the most votes from among a collection of voters. In the following this idea will be
presented more precisely, along with the terms and notational conventions required
for an easy understanding.
Let X = {−1, 0, 1} where −1 and 1 represent two competing alternatives,
or candidates; and 0 represents abstention, or a vote of non-preference. Let N =
{1, . . . , n} be the set of n voters with n ≥ 2. We will call any P = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn
a profile and we will sometimes denote any xi in P as P (i).
Definition 1.1. A function of the form f : Xn → X will be called a social aggre-
gation function.
This function receives some profile P ∈ Xn as its input, representing the
votes of n individuals, and outputs a single element of X. An output of 0 indicates
a tie between the two candidates, while any other output identifies the “winner” of
the election.
Our first example of a social aggregation function is given below, where
sign(x) =

1 if x > 0
−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0.
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Definition 1.2. The simple majority rule function, fs, is defined as:




It will only be the case that fs(P ) = 1 when P contains more ones than
negative ones, fs(P ) = −1 only when P contains more negative ones than ones,
and fs(P ) = 0 only when P contains exactly as many ones as negative ones (a tie).
This is the version of simple majority decision studied by Kenneth May [16]. May
introduced a set of axioms that any reasonably “fair” social aggregation function
should satisfy.
Axiom 1.1. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies anonymity if,
for any permutation σ of N = {1, . . . , n}, we have f(P ) = f(σP ), where σP =
(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)).
An anonymous function treats all votes equally, so no voter or group of voters
receives undue consideration. Since we will be dealing with anonymous functions,
all we are really concerned about is the number of votes each candidate receives.
We consider the following notation to help facilitate that idea:
K1(P ) = {i : P (i) = 1} and K−1(P ) = {i : P (i) = −1}.
Axiom 1.2. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies neutrality if, for
any P, P ′ ∈ Xn,
K1(P ) = K−1(P ′) and K−1(P ) = K1(P ′)⇒ [f(P ) = 1⇔ f(P ′) = −1].
A neutral function treats all candidates equally. If candidate 1 wins over
candidate −1, then switching all the votes should cause a switch in the winning
outcome, and vice versa. If the result is a tie, then switching all the votes should
cause no change and 0 should still be the outcome. Notice P ′ in the above can be
thought of as −P since it has a −1 wherever P has a 1 and a 1 wherever P has a
2
−1. Since our alternatives are 1, −1, and 0 we can say that a social aggregation
function f satisfies neutrality if and only if, for any profile P ∈ Xn,
f(−P ) = −f(P ).
Definition 1.3. For two profiles P, P ′ ∈ Xn we say P ≤ P ′ if P (i) ≤ P ′(i) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In this way we can describe P ′ as “favoring 1” more than P , since P ′ will
have at least as many votes for 1 as P and it can have at most as many votes for
−1 as P . This notion is expressed symbolically below.
P ≤ P ′ iff K1(P ) ⊆ K1(P ′) and K−1(P ′) ⊆ K−1(P ). (1.1)
It is easy to verify that “≤” forms a partial order on Xn.
Definition 1.4. A profile P ∈ Xn is almost equal to a profile P ′ ∈ Xn, denoted
P (ae)P ′, when there exists i0 ∈ N such that P (i) = P ′(i) for all i 6= i0 and
P (i0) 6= P ′(i0).
This simply means that the two profiles are identical in every position save
exactly one, where a difference must occur.
Axiom 1.3. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies positive respon-
siveness if f(P ) ∈ {0, 1}, P ≤ P ′, and P (ae)P ′ implies f(P ′) = 1.
This notion is not as complicated as it may appear. If a function outputs
a 1 or 0 for a particular profile and we change a single vote in such a way as to
favor candidate 1 (by either giving 1 an extra vote or taking a vote away from −1),
then the function that satisfies positive responsiveness will output a 1 on this new
profile.
With these axioms formally in place, we can state May’s Theorem.
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Theorem 1.1 (May’s Theorem). A social aggregation function f satisfies anonymity,
neutrality, and positive responsiveness if and only if f = fs.
Our goal is to generalize May’s Theorem by proving it for a much broader
domain, namely all finite median semilattices. The first step is to refine May’s
Theorem a bit, so as to make it amenable to generalization. We begin by splitting
up positive responsiveness into two simpler conditions. First we present a simple
implication of positive responsiveness.
Lemma 1.1. If f satisfies positive responsiveness and P ≤ P ′, P (ae)P ′ for some
P, P ′ ∈ Xn, then f(P ′) = −1 implies f(P ) = −1.
Proof. Suppose f satisfies positive responsiveness. Consider P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that
P ≤ P ′ and P (ae)P ′. If f(P ′) = −1 then it must be the case that f(P ) = −1 as
well. If not, i.e. f(P ) = 0 or f(P ) = 1, then positive responsiveness implies that
f(P ′) = 1, contradicting the assumption that f(P ′) = −1. Since X = {−1, 0, 1} it
must be the case that f(P ) = −1, as desired.
Axiom 1.4. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies monotonicity if,
for P, P ′ ∈ Xn, K1(P ) ⊆ K1(P ′) and K−1(P ′) ⊆ K−1(P ) implies
f(P ) = 1⇒ f(P ′) = 1 and f(P ′) = −1⇒ f(P ) = −1.
Using equation (1.1) we can express Axiom 1.4 in the following form:
P ≤ P ′ ⇒ f(P ) ≤ f(P ′).
Monotonicity handles the situation in positive responsiveness where the so-
cial aggregation function outputs a 1. This means that a monotonic function is one
that will select the same candidate as the winner for a particular profile whenever
it selects that candidate as the winner for a less favorable profile. Here, a“less fa-
vorable” profile is one in which that candidate receives fewer votes and/or one in
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which the alternative candidate receives more; since each voter has the option to
abstain (a vote of 0), these scenarios do not necessarily imply one another. The
alternative case presented in positive responsiveness, where the social aggregation
function outputs a 0, is treated below in its own axiom.
Axiom 1.5. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies tie-breaking if,
for P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that P (ae)P ′,
f(P ) = 0⇒ f(P ′) ∈ {−1, 1}.
When a social aggregation function outputs a 0 we consider this a tie between
the two candidates. A function that satisfies tie-breaking is simply that, a function
that breaks ties. If a function outputs a 0 for a particular profile and we change
exactly one vote, then a tie-breaking function would output anything but 0 for the
modified profile, thus breaking the tie.
Since the goal was to split positive responsiveness into two seperate condi-
tions, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.1. If a social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies positive
responsiveness then f satisfies monotonicity and tie-breaking.
Proof. Suppose we have two profiles P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ≤ P ′, P 6= P ′, and
f(P ) = 1. If P (ae)P ′ then positive responsiveness implies f(P ′) = 1. If it is not
the case that P (ae)P ′ then let i0 be the first position where P (i0) 6= P ′(i0). Now
we can consider P ′′ ∈ Xn such that P ′′(i) = P (i) for all i 6= i0 and P ′′(i0) = P ′(i0).
Thus, P ≤ P ′′ and P (ae)P ′′, hence positive responsivness implies f(P ′′) = 1 as
well. If P ′′(ae)P ′ then we can apply positive responsiveness again to get the desired
result, if not, then we can repeat this procedure on P ′′. Since the length of each
profile is finite, we can repeatedly apply this procedure to eventually achieve the
desired result of f(P ′) = 1.
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Alternatively, suppose we have two profiles P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ≤ P ′,
P 6= P ′, and f(P ′) = −1. If P (ae)P ′ then Lemma 1.1 implies f(P ) = −1. If it is
not the case that P (ae)P ′ then let i0 be the first position where P ′(i0) 6= P (i0). Now
we can consider P ′′ ∈ Xn such that P ′′(i) = P ′(i) for all i 6= i0 and P ′′(i0) = P (i0).
Thus, P ′′ ≤ P ′ and P ′′(ae)P ′, hence Lemma 1.1 implies f(P ′′) = −1 as well. If
P (ae)P ′′ then we can apply Lemma 1.1 again to get the desired result, if not,
then we can repeat this procedure on P ′′. Since the length of each profile is finite,
we can repeatedly apply this procedure to eventually achieve the desired result of
f(P ) = −1.
Suppose instead that P (ae)P ′ and f(P ) = 0. Since P (ae)P ′ we know that
either P ≤ P ′ or P ′ ≤ P . If P ≤ P ′, then, since f(P ) ∈ {0, 1} and P (ae)P ′,
f(P ′) = 1 by positive responsiveness. If P ′ ≤ P and f(P ′) = 0, then positive
responsiveness implies f(P ) = 1, contradicting the assumption that f(P ) = 0.
Therefore, in either case f(P ′) ∈ {−1, 1}.
It is also the case that the converse of this statement holds.
Proposition 1.2. If a social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies monotonic-
ity and tie-breaking then f satisfies positive responsiveness.
Proof. Suppose we have two profiles P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ≤ P ′, P (ae)P ′, and
f(P ) = 1. We can immediately apply monotonicity to get the desired result of
f(P ′) = 1. If, on the other hand, f(P ) = 0 then tie-breaking implies f(P ′) ∈
{−1, 1} and monotonicity implies f(P ′) ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, it must be the case that
f(P ′) = 1 as desired.
Now that the equivalence of these axioms has been demonstrated, we can
restate May’s Theorem using the new axioms.
Theorem 1.2 (May’s Theorem). A social aggregation function f satisfies anonymity,
neutrality, monotonicity, and tie-breaking if and only if f = fs.
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There are multiple directions one can take in the attempt to generalize May’s
Theorem. Before we consider expanding the domain to broader mathematical struc-
tures, we consider manipulating the axioms. This kind of thinking is in line with
other work that has been done on May’s Theorem. As¸an and Sanver replace positive
responsiveness with Maskin monotonicity and characterize the absolute q-majority
rules in [2]. For more on axiomatic modifications see [1], [4], [12], [22], and [24]. In
the next chapter we discuss a specific generalization of May’s Theorem, in which the
axiom of neutrality is dropped and a characterization of all aggregation functions
which satisfy anonymity and positive responsiveness is presented. After that, we
will extend simple majority rule to an order theoretic domain. For more on simple
majority rule with more than two alternatives see [3], [9], and [23].
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CHAPTER 2
A SIMPLE EXTENSION OF MAY’S THEOREM
2.1 Background
As we saw in the previous chapter, Kenneth May characterized all aggre-
gation functions that satisfy the properties of anonymity, neutrality, and positive
responsiveness and reached the result that they are all, in fact, equivalent to simple
majority rule. An obvious question to ask is what our social aggregation func-
tion would look like if we drop one of these axioms. In 1995 Young, Taylor, and
Zwicker characterized all aggregation functions that satisfy anonymity, neutrality,
and monotonicity, dropping the tie-breaking portion of positive responsiveness[24].
Their answer was based on a concept called quota systems. Perry and Powers built
on this concept and gave a characterization of all aggregation functions that satisfy
just anonymity and monotonicity, removing neutrality[22]. They based their work
on a concept known as a quota pair system. In the following section we build on this
work to characterize all aggregation functions that satisfy anonymity, monotonicity,
and tie-breaking i.e. all aggregation functions that satisfy anonymity and positive
responsiveness.
Definition 2.1. A quota system based on n ≥ 2 voters is a non-increasing se-
quence of integers





< qk ≤ n− k + 1 for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n};
Q2: qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk − 1} for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
Similar to the notation given in the previous section, we define a way to keep
track of the abstention votes; for any P ∈ Xn:
K0(P ) = {i : P (i) = 0}.
Thus, K0(P ) ∪K1(P ) ∪K−1(P ) = {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 2.2. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X, where X = {−1, 0, 1},
is determined by a quota system
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn
if, for any P ∈ Xn, we have
f(P ) =

1 if |K1(P )| ≥ qk and |K0(P )| = k
−1 if |K−1(P )| ≥ qk and |K0(P )| = k
0 otherwise.
Young, Taylor, and Zwicker[24] proved the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies anonymity,
neutrality, and monotonicity if and only if f is determined by a quota system.
The lower bound given in Q1 ensures the aggregation function is well-defined,
preventing 1 and −1 from both receiving enough votes to win in a single profile. The
second bound in Q1 eliminates redundant quota sytems since any quota higher than
the number of non-abstaining voters is unobtainable by either candidate; a situation
we still want to account for. Monotonicity is ensured by Q2. A quota system can
be used to create several common voting methods. Setting each qk to be a specific
fraction of the non-abstaining votes creates a supermajority function (such as the
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two-thirds and three-fifths majority used in our government [10]), where some level
of support greater than a half is required to select a winner. When one-half is
used (setting each qk equal to the least integer greater than half the number of
non-abstaining votes) the quota system is identical to May’s simple majority rule
as stated in the previous chapter. An alternative characterization is of these rules
was given by Fishburn, for more information see [8] and [14].
The notion of a quota system was expanded upon by Perry and Powers in
[22] to deal with the case where neutrality is dropped.
Definition 2.3. A quota pair system based on n ≥ 2 voters is a pair of non-
increasing sequences of integers
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
such that
QP1: 0 ≤ qk, lk ≤ n+ 1− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n};
QP2: qk + lk ≥ n+ 1− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n};
QP3: qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk − 1} and lk+1 ∈ {lk, lk − 1} for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
In a quota pair system the absence of neutrality forces the inclusion of a
second non-increasing sequence of integers so that each candidate has their own set
of quotas. The lower bound given in Q1 is replaced by the lower bound given in
QP2 in order to ensure our social aggregation function is well-defined. We will
illustrate a quota pair system with the following example:
Example 2.1. Let n = 2 and consider the non-increasing sequences
3 ≥ 2 ≥ 1 and 1 ≥ 0 ≥ 0.
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Here q0 = 3, q1 = 2, q2 = 1, l0 = 1, l1 = 0, and l2 = 0. Notice that
0 ≤ qk, lk ≤ 3−k for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, thus QP1 is satisfied. Observe that qk+lk ≥ 3−k
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, thus QP2 is satisfied. Also qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk−1} and lk+1 ∈ {lk, lk−1}
for k ∈ {0, 1}, thus QP3 is satisfied as well.
Definition 2.4. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X is determined by a
quota pair system
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
if, for P ∈ Xn, we have
f(P ) =

1 if |K1(P )| ≥ qk and |K0(P )| = k
−1 if |K−1(P )| ≥ lk and |K0(P )| = k
0 otherwise.
Notice that, due to the properties of a quota pair system, this is a well-defined
function.
Perry and Powers[22] proved the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies anonymity and
monotonicity if and only if f is determined by a quota pair system.
We build on their notion of a quota pair system to create what we call a
strong quota pair system.
2.2 Strong Quota Pair Systems
The material in this section has been submitted for publication [11].
Definition 2.5. A strong quota pair system based on n ≥ 2 voters, SQP system
for short, is a pair of non-increasing sequences of integers
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
such that
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SQP1: 0 ≤ qk, lk ≤ n+ 1− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n};
SQP2: n+ 1− k ≤ qk + lk ≤ n+ 2− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n};
SQP3: qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk − 1} and lk+1 ∈ {lk, lk − 1} for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1};
SQP4: qk + lk = n+ 2− k ⇒ qk−1 = qk and lk−1 = lk for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The upper bound given in SQP2 and the new condition SQP4 were added
to the definition of a quota pair system to ensure our aggregation function satisfies
tie-breaking. Observe that since the conditions on a quota pair system are all
conditions on a strong quota pair system we can conclude that any strong quota
pair system is itself a quota pair system. We will refer to a social aggregation
function being determined by a strong quota pair system in exactly the same way
that a function is determind by a quota pair system in Definition 2.4. We illustrate
the definition of a strong quota pair system with the following example:
Example 2.2. Let n = 2 and consider the non-increasing sequences
2 ≥ 2 ≥ 1 and 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 0.
Here q0 = 2, q1 = 2, q2 = 1, l0 = 1, l1 = 1, and l2 = 0. Notice that
0 ≤ qk, lk ≤ 3 − k for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, thus SQP1 is satisfied. Observe that 3 − k ≤
qk + lk ≤ 4−k for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, thus SQP2 is satisfied. Also qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk−1} and
lk+1 ∈ {lk, lk− 1} for k ∈ {0, 1}, thus SQP3 is satisfied. Finally, qk + lk = n+ 2− k
only when k = 1, that is q1 + l1 = 2 + 1 = n + 2 − k. Since q0 = q1 and l0 = l1
SQP4 is satisfied. Hence this pair of non-increasing sequences is a strong quota
pair system on 2 voters. With this new definition we can state our theorem.
Theorem 2.3. A social aggregation function f : Xn → X satisfies anonymity and
positive responsiveness if and only if f is determined by a strong quota pair system.
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Before we prove this theorem a lemma will be presented which offers some
insight as to when exactly this function will result in a tie.
Lemma 2.1. If a social aggregation function f : Xn → X is determined by a strong
quota pair system
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln,
then f(P ) = 0 for some profile P ∈ Xn if and only if qk + lk = n + 2 − k with
|K0(P )| = k, |K1(P )| = qk − 1, and |K−1(P )| = lk − 1.
Proof. Suppose f(P ) = 0, thus qk − 1 ≥ |K1(P )| and lk − 1 ≥ |K−1(P )| where
|K0(P )| = k, hence qk+lk−2 ≥ |K1(P )|+|K−1(P )| = n−k. Thus qk+lk ≥ n+2−k;
by SQP2 above we know qk + lk ≤ n + 2 − k therefore qk + lk = n + 2 − k =
|K1(P )|+ |K−1(P )|+ 2. Recall that qk − 1 ≥ |K1(P )| and lk − 1 ≥ |K−1(P )| hence
qk ≥ |K1(P )|+ 1 and lk ≥ |K−1(P )|+ 1, since qk + lk = |K1(P )|+ |K−1(P )|+ 2 we
get qk = |K1(P )|+ 1 and lk = |K−1(P )|+ 1.
If, for some profile P ∈ Xn, we have |K0(P )| = k, |K1(P )| = qk − 1, and
|K−1(P )| = lk−1 then clearly |K1(P )| < qk and |K−1(P )| < lk. Thus f(P ) = 0.
In Example 2.2 when k = 1 we have qk + lk = n + 2 − k but if we consider
P = (−1, 0) then |K1(P )| = 0 6= q1 − 1 and |K−1(P )| = 1 = l1 6= l1 − 1 thus
f(P ) = −1, not 0. If, on the other hand, we consider P = (1, 0) then |K0(P )| = 1,
|K1(P )| = q1 − 1, and |K−1(P )| = l1 − 1. Thus, f(P ) = 0.
Armed with Lemma 2.1, we are ready to prove Theorem 2.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Let f be a social aggregation function determined by a strong
quota pair system as above. Since a strong quota pair system is a quota pair system
it follows from Theorem 2.2 that f satisfies both anonymity and monotonicity. By
Proposition 1.2 all that remains to be shown is that f satisfies tie-breaking.
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Let P, P ′ ∈ Xn be two profiles such that P (ae)P ′ and f(P ) = 0. Want to
show f(P ′) ∈ {−1, 1}. Lemma 2.1 implies qk + lk = n + 2 − k with |K0(P )| = k,
|K1(P )| = qk−1, and |K−1(P )| = lk−1. Since P (ae)P ′ we know |K1(P )| 6= |K1(P ′)|
and/or |K−1(P )| 6= |K−1(P ′)|, furthermore, we know that |K0(P )|−1 ≤ |K0(P ′)| ≤
|K0(P )|+ 1. Let k′ = |K0(P ′)|, thus we can write k − 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k + 1.
If f(P ′) = 0 then Lemma 2.1 implies qk′+lk′ = n+2−k′ and |K1(P ′)| = qk′−1
as well as |K−1(P ′)| = lk′ − 1.
If k′ = k then we know |K1(P ′)| = qk′−1 = qk−1 = |K1(P )| and |K−1(P ′)| =
lk′ − 1 = lk − 1 = |K−1(P )|, contradicting the above observation that this is not
possible. Hence, k′ 6= k.
If k′ = k−1 then we know qk′+ lk′ = n+ 2−k′ = n+ 2− (k−1) = n+ 3−k.
But SQP4 says that qk + lk = n + 2 − k ⇒ qk−1 = qk and lk−1 = lk which implies
qk′ + lk′ = qk + lk = n + 2 − k, so we can’t have f(P ′) = 0 in this case without
contradicting SQP4. Hence, k′ 6= k − 1.
If k′ = k + 1 then SQP4 implies qk′ + lk′ = n + 2 − k′ ⇒ qk′−1 = qk′ and
lk′−1 = lk′ which implies qk + lk = n + 2 − k′ = n + 2 − (k + 1) = n + 1 − k,
contradicting Lemma 2.1 which implies qk + lk = n+ 2− k, so we know k′ 6= k + 1
either.
Thus, in any case, the tie is broken. Therefore, f satisfies positive respon-
sivness.
Let f be an aggregation function that satisfies anonymity and positive re-
sponsiveness. Proposition 1.1 implies f satisfies monotonicity. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 2.2, f is determined by a quota pair system
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln.
Our goal is to show that f is determined by a strong quota pair system. As
noted earlier, the differences between a quota pair system and a strong quota pair
14
system are the upper bound in SQP2 and the new condition SQP4. Since the
rest of the conditions of a strong quota pair system are inherited from a quota pair
system, these two conditions are all we need to show.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such
that qk + lk > n+ 2− k. Since qk, lk ≤ n+ 1− k it follows that qk ≥ 2 and lk ≥ 2.
Choose P ∈ Xn such that
|K1(P )| = qk − 2 and |K0(P )| = k.
Then
|K−1(P )| = n− (qk − 2 + k) = n+ 2− k − qk.
Since qk ≤ n+ 1− k it follows that
|K−1(P )| ≥ 1.
Since qk + lk > n+ 2− k it follows that
|K−1(P )| = n+ 2− k − qk < (qk + lk)− qk = lk.
Thus, f(P ) = 0 since |K1(P )| < qk and |K−1(P )| < lk. Choose i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that P (i0) = −1 and pick P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ′(ae)P and P ′(i0) = 1. Observe
that k′ = k where |K0(P )| = k and |K0(P ′)| = k′. Also notice that |K1(P ′)| =
|K1(P )|+ 1 = qk−1 and that |K−1(P ′)| = |K−1(P )|−1. Thus, |K1(P ′)| = qk−1 =
qk′ − 1 < qk′ and |K−1(P ′)| = |K−1(P )| − 1 < lk = lk′ . It follows that f(P ′) = 0 but
this contradicts tie-breaking. Hence qk + lk ≤ n+ 2− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and
so, SQP2 holds.
Assume that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that qk + lk = n + 2 − k and,
for the sake of contradiction, that either
qk = qk−1 − 1 and lk = lk−1 or qk = qk−1 and lk = lk−1 − 1.
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It can’t be the case that both qk = qk−1 − 1 and lk = lk−1 − 1, since SQP3 implies
qk−1 + lk−1 ≤ n+3−k. Suppose we have the case where qk = qk−1−1 and lk = lk−1.
Choose P ∈ Xn such that |K0(P )| = k and |K1(P )| = qk − 1 (such a P exists since
k + qk − 1 ≤ n and qk ≥ 1). Pick i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that P (i0) = 0 and choose
P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ′(ae)P and P ′(i0) = 1. First, notice that
|K−1(P )| = n− (k + qk − 1) = n+ 1− k − qk < (qk + lk)− qk = lk.
So f(P ) = 0 since |K−1(P )| < lk and |K1(P )| = qk − 1. Now notice that
|K0(P ′)| = k − 1,
|K1(P ′)| = qk = qk−1 − 1 = qk′ − 1, and
|K−1(P ′)| = |K−1(P )| < lk = lk−1 = lk′ .
Thus, f(P ′) = 0, contradicting tie-breaking. The case where qk = qk−1 and lk =
lk−1 − 1 can be solved symmetrically (choose P ′ with P ′(i0) = −1 instead). Thus
when qk + lk = n + 2 − k we know qk−1 = qk and lk−1 = lk which is exactly SQ4.
Hence, the quota pair system that determines f when f satisfies anonymity and
positive responsiveness is indeed a strong quota pair system.
2.3 Counting Strong Quota Pair Systems
It’s easy enough to count the number of social aggregation functions that
satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness; there’s only one, simple
majority rule. In the previous section we altered the axioms and characterized
social aggregation functions with quota systems, quota pair systems, and strong
quota pair systems. It is a natural question to ask how many of each of these there
are. Young, Taylor, and Zwicker[24] counted the number of quota systems.










where bxc is the greatest integer less than or equal to x.










where C(n) denotes the nth Catalan number. The Catalan numbers can be used
to formulate a recursive definition of ZQ(n):
Theorem 2.5.
ZQ(n+ 1) =
 2ZQ(n) if n is even,2ZQ(n)− C(n+12 ) if n is odd.
Perry and Powers[22] counted the number of quota pair systems.







Next we will present a lemma that illustrates how each strong quota pair
system contains a smaller strong quota pair system, and will give us a means to
systematically construct all quota pair systems; making them amenable to enumer-
ation.
Lemma 2.2. If q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln is a strong quota pair
system based on n ≥ 3 voters, then q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln is a strong quota
pair system based on n− 1 voters.
Proof. Let q′k = qk+1 and l
′
k = lk+1 for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, and let n′ = n − 1 as
well. To verify SQP1 we need to show that
0 ≤ q′k, l′k ≤ n′ + 1− k = n− k for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′}.
We know the qis and lis form a strong quota pair, hence
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0 ≤ q′k, l′k = qk+1, lk+1 ≤ n+ 1− (k + 1) = n− k for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′}
as desired. To verify SQP2 we need to show that
n′ + 1− k ≤ q′k + l′k ≤ n′ + 2− k for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′}.
Since the qis and lis form a strong quota pair, we know
n+ 1− (k + 1) ≤ qk+1 + lk+1 ≤ n+ 2− (k + 1) for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
If we substitute q′k for qk+1, l
′
k for lk+1, and n
′ for n− 1 we get
n′ + 1− k ≤ q′k + l′k ≤ n′ + 2− k for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′}
as desired. To verify SQP3 we need to show that
q′k+1 ∈ {q′k, q′k − 1} and l′k+1 ∈ {l′k, l′k − 1} for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′ − 1}.
Since q′k = qk+1 and l
′
k = lk+1 we get q
′
k+1 = qk+2 and l
′
k+1 = lk+2. Since the qis and
lis form a strong quota pair we know
qk+2 ∈ {qk+1, qk+1 − 1} and lk+2 ∈ {lk+1, lk+1 − 1} for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 2}.
Substituting leads us to
q′k+1 ∈ {q′k, q′k − 1} and l′k+1 ∈ {l′k, l′k − 1} for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n′ − 1}




′ + 2− k ⇒ q′k−1 = q′k and l′k−1 = l′k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}.
As the qis and lis form a strong quota pair system, we know
qk+1 + lk+1 = n+ 2− (k + 1)⇒ qk = qk+1 and lk = lk+1 for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.




′ + 2− k ⇒ q′k−1 = q′k and l′k−1 = l′k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}
as desired.
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The previous lemma suggests a strategy to modify the strong quota pair
systems for n voters to create all strong quota pair systems for any n + 1 voters.
Our method will involve shifting each quota “up” (i.e. increasing all subscripts)
and assigning a new q0 and l0. As long as we are careful with our choices for q0
and l0, making sure our new strong quota pair systems meet all the criteria of the
definition, then we will only create legitimate strong quota pair systems. This is
accomplished in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3. If the pair of non-increasing sequences of integers q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn
and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln is a strong quota pair system based on n ≥ 2 voters,
 = (n+ 2)− (q0 + l0), q′0 ∈ {q0, q0 + } and l′0 ∈ {l0, l0 + }, and q′0 + l′0 ≥ q0 + l0 + ,
then
q′0 ≥ q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l′0 ≥ l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
is a strong quota pair system on n+ 1 voters.
Proof. Suppose q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln is a strong quota pair
system based on n voters. Consider q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′m and l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′m,
(hereafter referred to as the prime sequences), where m = n+1, such that q′i = qi−1
and l′i = li−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, q′0 ∈ {q0, q0 + } and l′0 ∈ {l0, l0 + }. We know from
SQP1 that
0 ≤ qk, lk ≤ n+ 1− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
This can be re-indexed to obtain
0 ≤ qk−1, lk−1 ≤ n+ 1− (k − 1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1},
which can be rewritten as
0 ≤ qk−1, lk−1 ≤ (n+ 1) + 1− k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
We can make substitutions based on the values defined above to get
0 ≤ q′k, l′k ≤ m+ 1− k for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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Since  = (n + 2) − (q0 + l0), SQP2 tells us that  ∈ {0, 1}. From SQP1, we can
see that 0 ≤ q0, l0 ≤ n+ 1, thus 0 ≤ q′0, l′0 ≤ (n+ 1) + 1 = m+ 1, thus
0 ≤ q′k, l′k ≤ m+ 1− k for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}.
Hence, the prime sequences satisfy SQP1. We know from SQP2 that
n+ 1− k ≤ qk + lk ≤ n+ 2− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
This can be re-indexed to obtain
n+ 1− (k − 1) ≤ qk−1 + lk−1 ≤ n+ 2− (k − 1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1},
which can be rewritten as
(n+ 1) + 1− k ≤ qk−1 + lk−1 ≤ (n+ 1) + 2− k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
Substituting as above yields
m+ 1− k ≤ q′k + l′k ≤ m+ 2− k for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
From SQP2 we can see that n+1 ≤ q0+l0 ≤ n+2. If q0+l0 = n+2 then  = 0, hence
q′0 = q0 and l
′
0 = l0. Thus it is clearly the case that (n+1)+1 ≤ q′0+ l′0 ≤ (n+1)+2,
that is, m + 1 ≤ q′0 + l′0 ≤ m + 2. If q0 + l0 = n + 1 then  = 1. We assumed
q′0 + l
′
0 ≥ q0 + l0 +  thus q′0 + l′0 ≥ (n + 1) + 1 and the largest that q′0 + l′0 could
be is q0 + l0 + 2 = (n + 1) + 2. Thus (n + 1) + 1 ≤ q′0 + l′0 ≤ (n + 1) + 2, that is,
m+ 1 ≤ q′0 + l′0 ≤ m+ 2, thus
m+ 1− k ≤ q′k + l′k ≤ m+ 2− k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
Hence, the prime sequences satisfy SQP2. We know from SQP3 that
qk+1 ∈ {qk, qk − 1} and lk+1 ∈ {lk, lk − 1} for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
This can be re-indexed to obtain
qk ∈ {qk−1, qk−1 − 1} and lk ∈ {lk−1, lk−1 − 1} for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Substituting as above yields
q′k+1 ∈ {q′k, q′k − 1} and l′k+1 ∈ {l′k, l′k − 1} for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Since q′0 ∈ {q0, q0 + } and l′0 ∈ {l0, l0 + } we can say q′1 ∈ {q′0, q′0 − 1} and
l′1 ∈ {l′0, l′0 − 1}, thus
q′k+1 ∈ {q′k, q′k − 1} and l′k+1 ∈ {l′k, l′k − 1} for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Hence, the prime sequences satisfy SQP3. We know from SQP4 that
qk + lk = n+ 2− k ⇒ qk−1 = qk and lk−1 = lk for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
This can be re-indexed to obtain
qk−1+ lk−1 = n+2−(k−1)⇒ qk−2 = qk−1 and lk−2 = lk−1 for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n+1},
which can be rewritten as
qk−1+ lk−1 = (n+1)+2−k ⇒ qk−2 = qk−1 and lk−2 = lk−1 for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n+1}.
Substituting as above yields
q′k + l
′
k = m+ 2− k ⇒ q′k−1 = q′k and l′k−1 = l′k for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
If q′1 + l
′
1 = m+ 2− 1 then q0 + l0 = n+ 2, thus  = 0 and we have q′0 = q0 = q′1 and
l′0 = l0 = l
′
1. Thus, we can write
q′k + l
′
k = m+ 2− k ⇒ q′k−1 = q′k and l′k−1 = l′k for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Hence the prime sequences satisfy SQP4. Thus,
q′0 ≥ q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l′0 ≥ l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
is a strong quota pair sytem on m = n+ 1 voters, as desired.
To help understand this lemma, consider the following examples.
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Example 2.3. Consider the strong quota pair system on 2 voters from example 1:
(3, 2, 1) and (1, 0, 0).
This strong quota pair system attains its upper bound in the k = 0 case;
q0 + l0 = 3 + 1 = 4 = 2 + 2− 0 = n+ 2− 0.
If those values belonged to the q1 and l1 position in a strong quota pair system on
3 voters then SQP4 implies that they could only be preceded by q0 and l0 creating
the strong quota pair system:
(3, 3, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 0, 0).
Example 2.4. Consider the strong quota pair system on 2 voters:
(2, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 0).
This strong quota pair system attains it’s lower bound in the k = 0 case;
q0 + l0 = 2 + 1 = 3 = 2 + 1− 0 = n+ 1− 0.
If those values belonged to the q1 and l1 position in a strong quota pair system on 3
voters then SQP2 implies that they could be preceded by any of three combinations
of q0s and l0s since in this case q0 = q1 + 1 or l0 = l1 + 1 or both, creating the
following strong quota pair systems:
(3, 2, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 0),
(2, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 0),
(3, 2, 2, 1) and (2, 1, 1, 0).
Let ZSQP (n) be the number of strong quota pair systems on n ≥ 2 voters.
Our goal is to find a formula for ZSQP (n).
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Lemma 2.4. ZSQP (2) = 17.
Proof. We present a complete list of all strong quota pair systems on n = 2 voters:
(0, 0, 0) and (3, 2, 1), (1, 0, 0) and (2, 2, 1), (1, 1, 0) and (2, 1, 1),
(3, 2, 1) and (0, 0, 0), (2, 2, 1) and (1, 0, 0), (2, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0),
(1, 1, 0) and (2, 2, 1), (1, 1, 1) and (2, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1) and (2, 1, 1),
(2, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 0), (2, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1),
(1, 0, 0) and (3, 2, 1), (2, 1, 0) and (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1) and (2, 1, 1),
(3, 2, 1) and (1, 0, 0), (2, 1, 1) and (2, 1, 0).
Observe that there are 17 SQP systems on n = 2 voters presented in the list
above.
We now come to the main theorem of this section.























Proof. Let A(n) be the set of all strong quota pair systems on n ≥ 2 voters,
q0 ≥ q1 ≥ . . . ≥ qn and l0 ≥ l1 ≥ . . . ≥ ln
such that q0 + l0 = n + 2. Similarly, let B(n) be the set of all strong quota pair
systems such that q0 + l0 = n+ 1. We will let
an = |A(n)| and bn = |B(n)|.
Consider a function f : A(n+ 1)→ B(n) defined by
f(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1) = q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1.
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It follows from Lemma 2.2 that q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1
is a SQP system on n voters. We know that q′0 + l
′
0 = (n + 1) + 2. By SQP2
we know q′1 + l
′
1 ≤ (n + 1) + 2 − 1. Since q′1 + l′1 < q′0 + l′0, it follows from the
contrapositive of SQP4 that q′1 + l
′
1 6= (n + 1) + 2 − 1. Therefore, by SQP2, we
have q′1 + l
′
1 = (n+ 1) + 1− 1 = n+ 1. Thus, f is well-defined.
Also, f is invertible, with the mapping f−1 : B(n)→ A(n+ 1) defined by
f−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n) = q′0+1 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0+1 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n.
It follows from Lemma 2.3 that q′0 + 1 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 + 1 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n is a
SQP system on n+ 1 voters. We know that q′0 + l
′
0 = n+ 1, thus
(q′0 + 1) + (l
′
0 + 1) = n+ 3 = (n+ 1) + 2.
Hence, f−1 is well-defined. Consider the composition
f(f−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n)).
Clearly this is equal to q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n. Consider the
composition
f−1(f(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1))
which is equal to q′1 + 1 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 + 1 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1. We saw above
that q′1 + l
′
1 = (n + 1) + 1− 1 = n + 1 and we assumed q′0 + l′0 = (n + 1) + 2 thus,
according to SQP3, we know
q′0 = q
′





We can conclude from this that f is a bijection between A(n+ 1) and B(n). Thus,
an+1 = bn.
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Let Bˆ(n) be the set of all SQP systems on n ≥ 2 voters such that q0 + l0 = n + 1
where
q0 = q1 + 1 and l0 = l1.
Let B˜(n) be the set of all SQP systems on n ≥ 2 voters such that q0 + l0 = n + 1
where
q0 = q1 and l0 = l1 + 1.
Let B¯(n) be the set of all SQP systems on n ≥ 2 voters such that q0 + l0 = n + 1
where
q0 = q1 and l0 = l1.
These three sets are clearly pairwise disjoint by definition. Moreover, SQP3 implies
that the only other possible SQP system that can exist is one where
q0 = q1 + 1 and l0 = l1 + 1,
but, in this case, it cannot be that q0+l0 = n+1 since this would imply q1+l1 = n−1,
which directly contradicts SQP2. Thus, we can say that
Bˆ(n) ∪ B˜(n) ∪ B¯(n) = B(n).
Consider a function g : Bˆ(n+ 1)→ B(n) defined by
g(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1) = q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1.
It follows from Lemma 2.2 that q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1 is a SQP
system on n voters. We know that q′0 + l
′




1 + 1 and
l′0 = l
′




1 = n+ 1. Thus, g is well-defined.
Also, g is invertible, with the mapping g−1 : B(n)→ Bˆ(n+ 1) defined by
g−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n) = q′0+1 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n.
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It follows from Lemma 2.3 that q′0 + 1 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n is a SQP
system on n+ 1 voters. We know that q′0 + l
′
0 = n+ 1, thus
(q′0 + 1) + l
′
0 = n+ 2 = (n+ 1) + 1.
Hence, g−1 is well-defined. Consider the composition
g(g−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n)).
Clearly this is equal to q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n. Consider the
composition
g−1(g(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1)),
which is equal to q′1 + 1 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1. According to how








1 + 1 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥
q′n+1, l
′
1 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1 = q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1. We can
conclude that g is a bijection between Bˆ(n+ 1) and B(n). Thus,
|Bˆ(n+ 1)| = bn.
Consider a function h : B˜(n+ 1)→ B(n) defined by
h(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1) = q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1.
A symmetric argument to the one presented above for g can be used to show
that h is a bijection between B˜(n+ 1) and B(n). Thus,
|B˜(n+ 1)| = bn.
Consider a function j : B¯(n+ 1)→ A(n) defined by
j(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1) = q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1.
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It follows from Lemma 2.2 that q′1 ≥ q′2 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′2 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1 is a SQP
system on n voters. We know that q′0 + l
′









we know q′1 + l
′
1 = n+ 2. Thus, j is well-defined.
Also, j is invertible, with the mapping j−1 : A(n)→ B¯(n+ 1) defined by
j−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n) = q′0 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n.
It follows from Lemma 2.3 that q′0 ≥ q′0 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′0 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n is a SQP
system on n+ 1 voters. We know that q′0 + l
′
0 = n+ 2, thus
q′0 + l
′
0 = n+ 2 = (n+ 1) + 1.
Hence, j−1 is well-defined. Consider the composition
j(j−1(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n)).
Clearly this is equal to q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n. Consider the
composition
j−1(j(q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1)),
which is equal to q′1 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1. According to how








1 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′1 ≥
l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1 = q′0 ≥ q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n+1, l′0 ≥ l′1 ≥ . . . ≥ l′n+1. We can conclude that
j is a bijection between B¯(n+ 1) and A(n). Thus,
|B¯(n+ 1)| = an.
Recall that Bˆ(n) ∪ B˜(n) ∪ B¯(n) = B(n). Thus, using the relations just shown, we
can write
bn+1 = an + 2bn.
It was show earlier that an+1 = bn, we can use this fact along with the equality just
established and the definition of ZSQP (n) to write the following equalities:
ZSQP (n+ 2) = an+2 + bn+2 = bn+1 + an+1 + 2bn+1 = ZSQP (n+ 1) + 2bn+1.
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We can continue to apply our known equalities to the right-hand side to obtain:
ZSQP (n+ 2) = ZSQP (n+ 1) + bn+1 +an+ 2bn = ZSQP (n+ 1) + bn+1 +an+ bn+an+1.
If we regroup this we can rewrite ZSQP (n+ 2) as the following homogeneous linear
recurrence relation:
ZSQP (n+ 2) = 2ZSQP (n+ 1) + ZSQP (n).
This recurrence has the following characteristic equation:
x2 − 2x− 1 = 0.
The roots of the characteristic equation can be found to be 1 ± √2, thus we can
write ZSQP (n) as:





where c1, c2 ∈ R are some constants. We can solve for these constants if we can
establish sufficient base cases. Lemma 2.4 tells us that ZSQP (2) = 17, and we can
further inspect this list to find that a2 = 5 and b2 = 12. These values can be used
with the previously determined equalities to find that a3 = 12 and b3 = 29, thus
ZSQP (3) = 41. These base cases enable us to set up a system of linear equations in
two variables:













































Table 2.1 – Number of functions on n voters
Axioms n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
A,N,Mon,TB 1 1 1 1
A,N,Mon 3 6 10 20
A,Mon,TB 17 41 99 239
A,Mon 35 126 462 1716
The sequence generated by this formula for the number of strong quota pair
systems on n voters is a known one. It has several different interpretations that
can be found in [21]. Table 2.1 lists the number of distinct functions satisfying
the various combinations of axioms discussed in this chapter. This gives a general




Before we can discuss generalizing May’s Theorem to an order theoretic
domain some background must be provided. This is a brief chapter on language
and concepts needed to understand the next chapter. For more information on
median semilattices see [5] and [20], the latter having an emphasis on the related
idea of median graphs.
Definition 3.1. A partial order is a relation on a set X that is reflexive, transi-
tive, and antisymmetric.
We will henceforth refer to the set X as a partially ordered set (poset), taking
it as implied that there is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation on it.
The least upper bound, or supremum, of two elements is referred to as their join.
For any two elements a, b ∈ X their join is denoted as:
a ∨ b = sup{a, b}.
The greatest lower bound, or infimum, of two elements is referred to as their meet.
For any two elements a, b ∈ X their meet is denoted as:
a ∧ b = inf{a, b}.
Definition 3.2. If X is a partially ordered set in which any two elements have a
join and a meet, then X is a lattice.
If X is finite then this definition implies X has a maximum and a minimum
element, conventionally denoted as 1 and 0 respectively.
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Definition 3.3. If X is a partially ordered set in which any two elements have a
meet, then X is a meet semilattice.
It follows from this definition that every lattice is a meet semilattice as well.
A distributive lattice is one in which the conventional notion of distributivity applied
to joins and meets holds for all elements in the lattice. Meaning, for all elements
a, b, c ∈ X we have
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) and a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c).
Definition 3.4. A meet semilattice X is distributive if, for all x ∈ X, the set
{y ∈ X|y ≤ x} is a distributive lattice.
The following definitions round out the majority of the vocabulary needed
to understand the next chapter.
Definition 3.5. A meet semilattice X satisfies the join-Helly property if, for all
x, y, z ∈ X, whenever x ∨ y, x ∨ z, and y ∨ z exist, then x ∨ y ∨ z exists as well.
In Figure 3.1 we can see an example of a finite meet semilattice that does





Figure 3.1: A meet semilattice that is not a median semilattice
Definition 3.6. A meet semilattice is a median semilattice if it is distributive
and satisfies the join-Helly property.
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In Figure 3.2 we can see the median semilattice that represents the two-
alternative version of May’s Theorem discussed in the previous chapters. Another




Figure 3.2: May’s Case
Definition 3.7. An element j of a meet semilattice X is join irreducible if j 6= 0
and j = x ∨ y ⇒ j = x or j = y for all x, y ∈ X.
The definition of median semilattice is the key concept needed for the gen-
eralization in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
MAY’S THEOREM ON MEDIAN SEMILATTICES
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter some definitions and ideas concerning ordered sets
were presented. Prior to that, May’s Theorem and and some generalizations of
May’s Theorem were given in the case of two alternatives. This two-alternative
case can be thought of as a particular example of a median semilattice. In this
chapter we will state and prove our main result, a generalization of May’s theorem
to an arbitrary finite median semilattice.
Let X be a finite median semilattice. This X represents a collection of
alternatives from which one will be selected. We call any P = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn
a profile for some n ≥ 2. This profile represents the preferences of N = {1, . . . , n}
individuals from amongst the alternatives in X. As in Chapter 1, we will denote
the preference of a particular individual, xi, as P (i).
Definition 4.1. A function of the form f : Xn → X will be called a consensus
function.
Let J be the set of all join irreducible elements of X. Next we establish some
important notation. For any P ∈ Xn and any join irreducible j ∈ J let
Kj(P ) = {i ∈ N : j ≤ P (i)} and Kj(P ) = {i ∈ N : j ∨ P (i) D.N.E.}.
Here, the abbreviation “D.N.E.” means “does not exist.” Put simply, Kj(P )
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represents the individuals who favor j, and Kj(P ) represents the individuals who
do not favor j. Observe that when X is lattice, Kj(P ) = ∅ for all j ∈ J . It is
worth noting that since X is a meet semilattice, it has a 0 element. This represents
the notion of abstention or non-preference, as distinguished from the elements of
Kj(P ), which are better thought of as preferences for a competitor to j. We keep
track of these abstentions with a special case of our established notation, where, for
P ∈ Xn we have:
K0(P ) = {i ∈ N : P (i) = 0}.
Now we define an extremely important example of a consensus function.
Definition 4.2. The simple majority rule function, fs : X
n → X, is defined
such that for any P ∈ Xn:
fs(P ) =
∨
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|}.
Presented below is a useful lemma concerning the simple majority rule func-
tion. The proof of this lemma uses the concept of a join prime element. An element
j ∈ X is join prime if j ≤ x ∨ y ⇒ j ≤ x or j ≤ y for all x, y ∈ X.
Lemma 4.1. For any t ∈ J and P ∈ Xn, t ≤ fs(P )⇒ |Kt(P )| > |Kt(P )|.
Proof. Suppose t ≤ fs(P ) =
∨{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|}. Since X is distributive
and t is a join irreducible, we know t is join prime; thus it follows that t ≤ j
such that |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|. Since t ≤ j we know that |Kt(P )| ≥ |Kj(P )| and,
moreover, that |Kj(P )| ≥ |Kt(P )|. To get this last relation, observe that if t ≤ j
and t ∨ x does not exist for some x ∈ X then j ∨ x does not exist either. Thus,
|Kt(P )| ≥ |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )| ≥ |Kt(P )|
as desired.
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Remark 4.1. It is worth mentioning that Lemma 4.1 is indeed a true biconditional,
as the reverse direction is a direct consequence of the definition of fs.
Remark 4.2. Observe that if X is a lattice, then, for any P = (x1, . . . , xn),
fs(P ) = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn.
Since X is a lattice, it follows that Kj(P ) = ∅ ∀j ∈ J and so
fs(P ) =
∨
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > 0}. (4.1)
Since X is distributive, we know that every element of X is the join of all the join
irreducibles less than or equal to it, thus if t ∈ J and t ≤ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . .∨ xn then we
know t ≤ xi for some i. In this case, |Kt(P )| > 0 which implies t ≤ fs(P ) by Remark
4.1, so it follows that x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn ≤ fs(P ). If j ∈ J satisfies j ≤ fs(P ), then
by Lemma 4.1, |Kj(P )| > 0 and so j ≤ xi for some i. Thus, j ≤ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn.
It follows that fs(P ) ≤ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn. Hence fs(P ) = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn.
Below is another consensus function defined only in the case when the finite
median semilattice X is also a lattice.
Definition 4.3. The top function, fT : X
n → X, is defined such that for any
P ∈ Xn:
fT (P ) = 1 ∀P ∈ Xn.
The top function will be important in this chapter.
4.2 Axioms
Axiom 4.1. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Anonymity (A) if, for
any P ∈ Xn and any σ, a permutation of N = {1, . . . , n}; f(σP ) = f(P ).
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This means that f(P ) is determined only by the elements of Pi that appear,
regardless of how they are assigned; i.e. an anonymous function makes a decision
based on what the ballots say, not who submitted each one. Also called equality or
egalitarian [16].
Axiom 4.2. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Monotonicity (MON)
if, for any P, P ′ ∈ Xn and any j ∈ J ; if Kj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′) and Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P )
then j ≤ f(P )⇒ j ≤ f(P ′).
This means that f responds to changes of preference in a “positive” way.
That is, if f favors j and any individual or group of individuals changes their vote
in such a way that they now favor j then f will still favor j.
Axiom 4.3. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Competitive Decisive
Neutrality (CDN) if, for any P, P ′ ∈ Xn and any j, j′ ∈ J ;
Kj(P ) = Kj′(P
′) and Kj(P ) = Kj′(P ′)⇒ [j ≤ f(P )⇔ j′ ≤ f(P ′)].
This means f does not favor any of the alternatives over another. Thus, if we
replaced all the votes consistently, f would favor whichever alternative replaced the
previous winner. This axiom is an extention of May’s Neutrality and first appeared
in [17].
Axiom 4.4. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Tie Breaking (TB) if,
for every P, P ′ ∈ Xn and j, j′ ∈ J such that
{P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0}
and P (ae)P ′
we have
j  f(P ) and j′  f(P )⇒ j ≤ f(P ′) or j′ ≤ f(P ′).
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This is what it sounds like; if the result is a tie and a single vote changes
then f will pick a winner, breaking the tie. It is worth remarking that it is possible
for j = j′, in which case TB becomes simplified quite a bit. Meaning, if j = j′ then
{P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {j, 0}
and P (ae)P ′
implies
j  f(P )⇒ j ≤ f(P ′).
Theorem 4.1. The simple majority rule function, fs, satisfies Anonymity, Mono-
tonicity, Competitive Decisive Neutrality, and Tie-Breaking.
Proof. Since fs(P ) is determined by the values |Kj(P )| and |Kj(P )| it follow that
fs satisfies A.
Suppose P, P ′ ∈ Xn are two profiles such thatKj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′), Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P ), and j ≤
fs(P ) for some j ∈ J . To show fs satisfies MON we need to show that j ≤ fs(P ′).
Observe that,
Kj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′)⇒ |Kj(P )| ≤ |Kj(P ′)|
Kj(P
′) ⊆ Kj(P )⇒ |Kj(P ′)| ≤ |Kj(P )|.
By Lemma 4.1 we have j ≤ fs(P )⇒ |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|. Thus,
|Kj(P ′)| ≥ |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )| ≥ |Kj(P ′)|
which, by the definition of fs, implies j ≤ fs(P ′) as desired.
Suppose P, P ′ ∈ Xn are two profiles such thatKj(P ) = Kj′(P ′), Kj(P ) = Kj′(P ′), and j ≤
fs(P ) for some j, j
′ ∈ J . To show fs satisfies CDN we need to show that j′ ≤ fs(P ′).
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By Lemma 4.1 we have j ≤ fs(P )⇒ |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|. Thus,
|Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P ′)|.
Hence j′ ≤ fs(P ′) as desired. The reverse direction, j′ ≤ fs(P ′) ⇒ j ≤ fs(P ) is
done in a similar way.
To show fs satisfies TB, consider P, P
′ ∈ Xn such that for j, j′ ∈ J we have
{P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0}
P (ae)P ′,
j  fs(P ),
and j′  fs(P ).
We want to show that j ≤ fs(P ′) or j′ ≤ fs(P ′); this will be handled in two cases.
Case 1: j ∨ j′ exists.
In this case, since {P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0}, we know Kj(P ) = ∅ = Kj′(P ). Lemma
4.1 tells us that
j  fs(P )⇒ |Kj(P )| ≤ |Kj(P )|,
j′  fs(P )⇒ |Kj′(P )| ≤ |Kj′(P )|.
Thus Kj(P ) = ∅ = Kj′(P ), hence P = P0 where {P0} = {0}. Since P (ae)P ′ and
{P}∪{P ′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0} we know either P ′(i) = j or P ′(i) = j′ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If P ′(i) = j then |Kj(P ′)| = 1 > 0 = |Kj(P ′)| implying j ≤ f(P ′). If P ′(i) = j′
instead, then |Kj′(P ′)| = 1 > 0 = |Kj′(P ′)| implying j′ ≤ f(P ′). Thus, j ≤ f(P ′)
or j′ ≤ f(P ′) as desired.
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Case 2: j ∨ j′ does not exist.
In this case, since {P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0} we know
Kj(P ) = Kj′(P ), Kj′(P ) = Kj(P ),
Kj(P
′) = Kj′(P ′), Kj′(P ′) = Kj(P ′).
Using Lemma 4.1 again, we know
j  fs(P )⇒ |Kj(P )| ≤ |Kj(P )|,
j′  fs(P )⇒ |Kj′(P )| ≤ |Kj′(P )|.
We can combine these two sets of facts to conclude that
|Kj′(P )| = |Kj(P )| ≤ |Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P )| and
|Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P )| ≤ |Kj′(P )| = |Kj(P )|.
Hence,
|Kj(P )| = |Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P )| = |Kj′(P )|.
Since P (ae)P ′, the difference between P and P ′ can be divided in to three possible
subcases:
If P (i0) = j
′, then P ′(i0) = 0 or P ′(i0) = j.
If P ′(i0) = 0 then |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj′(P )| − 1 and |Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )|. Hence
|Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P )| > |Kj′(P )| − 1 = |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj(P ′)|.
Thus j ≤ fs(P ′).
If P ′(i0) = j then |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj′(P )| − 1 and |Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )|+ 1. Hence
|Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )|+ 1 > |Kj(P )| − 1 = |Kj′(P )| − 1 = |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj(P ′)|.
Thus j ≤ fs(P ′).
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If P (i0) = j then an argument symmetric to the one just given can be used to
conclude j′ ≤ fs(P ′).
If P (i0) = 0, then P
′(i0) = j or P ′(i0) = j′. If P ′(i0) = j then |Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )|+1
and |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj′(P )|, thus
|Kj(P ′)| = |Kj(P )|+ 1 > |Kj(P )| = |Kj′(P )| = |Kj′(P ′)| = |Kj(P ′)|.
Thus j ≤ fs(P ′).
If P ′(i0) = j′, then an equivalent argument will conclude j′ ≤ fs(P ′), as desired.
Theorem 4.2. When X is a lattice, the top function, fT , satisfies Anonymity,
Monotonicity, Competitive Decisive Neutrality, and Tie-Breaking.
Proof. Since fT (P ) = 1 ∀P ∈ Xn we have fT (P ) = fT (σP ) = 1 for any σ, hence,
fT satisfies A.
Suppose P, P ′ ∈ Xn are two profiles such that Kj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′), Kj(P ′) ⊆
Kj(P ), and j ≤ fT (P ) for some j ∈ J . To show fT satisfies MON we need to
show that j ≤ fT (P ′). Since fT (P ′) = 1 it is clearly the case that j ≤ fT (P ′).
Suppose P, P ′ ∈ Xn are two profiles such that Kj(P ) = Kj′(P ′), Kj(P ) =
Kj′(P
′), and j ≤ fT (P ) for some j, j′ ∈ J . To show fT satisfies CDN we need to
show that j′ ≤ fT (P ′). Since fT (P ′) = 1 it is clearly the case that j ≤ fT (P ′).
Since fT (P ) = 1 ∀P ∈ Xn, it will never be the case that j  fT (P ) for any
j or P . This means the conditions of TB will never be met, thus it is vacuously
satisfied.
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Not only do these two functions satisfy our axioms, they are characterized
by them. This fact is the main result of this thesis and is proven below.
4.3 Main Result
Theorem 4.3. If X is a finite median semilattice and f : Xn → X satisfies
Anonymity, Monotonicity, Competitive Decisive Neutrality, and Tie-Breaking then
f = fs or f = fT .
To prove this theorem we first consider the profile P0, where {P0} = {0}, in
a lemma. We will build up to less trivial profiles in a series of lemmas, culminating
in the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 4.2. f(P0) = 0 or f(P0) = 1.
Proof. Suppose f(P0) 6= 0. Since X is finite there exists j ∈ J such that j ≤ f(P0).
For any j′ ∈ J notice that
Kj(P0) = Kj′(P0) = ∅ and Kj(P0) = Kj′(P0) = ∅.
Thus, by CDN, j ≤ f(P0) ⇔ j′ ≤ f(P0). Since j′ was an arbitrary element of J ,
this implies t ≤ f(P0) ∀t ∈ J , hence f(P0) = 1.
Observe that the previous lemma follows directly from CDN and does not
use the other axioms.
Lemma 4.3. If j ∈ J satisfies j ≤ f(P ) for some P ∈ Xn, and f(P0) = 0, then
Kj(P ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. j ≤ f(P ) and Kj(P ) = ∅ for some P ∈ Xn. Then
Kj(P ) = Kj(P0) = ∅ and Kj(P0) ⊆ Kj(P ).
Thus, MON implies j ≤ f(P0), which contradicts the assumption that f(P0) = 0.
Therefore Kj(P ) 6= ∅.
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Notice that the previous lemma follows directly from MON and does not
use the other axioms.
Lemma 4.4. If {P} ⊆ {j, 0} for some P ∈ Xn and j ∈ J such that Kj(P ) 6= ∅,
and f(P0) = 0, then j ≤ f(P ).
Proof. Consider P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ′(i0) = j for some i0 ∈ Kj(P ) and P ′(i) = 0
for all i 6= i0. Thus
{P ′} ∪ {P0} ⊆ {j, 0}
and P ′(ae)P0
Since j  f(P0) TB implies j ≤ f(P ′). Since Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P ) and Kj(P ) =
Kj(P
′) = ∅, MON implies j ≤ f(P ).
The previous lemma follows from MON and TB.
Lemma 4.5. If {P} ⊆ {j1, j2, 0} and |Kj1(P )| = |Kj2(P )| > 0 for P ∈ Xn and
j1, j2 ∈ J such that j1 ∨ j2 does not exist, then
f(P ) =
∨
{t ∈ J : t ≤ j1 and t ∨ j2 exists
or t ≤ j2 and t ∨ j1 exists}.
Proof. Consider t ∈ J such that t ≤ j1 and t ∨ j2 exists. Also consider P ′ ∈ Xn
such that {P ′} ⊆ {j1, 0} and Kj1(P ′) = Kj1(P ). By Lemma 4.4, j1 ≤ f(P ′).
Consider P ′′ ∈ Xn such that {P ′′} ⊆ {t, 0} and Kt(P ′′) = Kj1(P ′). Which im-
plies t ≤ f(P ′′), again by Lemma 4.4.
Observe Kt(P
′′) ⊆ Kt(P ) and Kt(P ′′) = Kt(P ) = ∅, thus, MON implies t ≤ f(P ).
Suppose u ∈ J such that u ≤ f(P ). Since we assumed the existence of j1, j2 ∈ J
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such that j1 ∨ j2 does not exist, we know X can’t be a lattice. Since X is not a
lattice it cannot be the case that f(P0) = 1, thus Lemma 4.2 implies f(P0) = 0,
hence, Lemma 4.3 implies Ku(P ) 6= ∅. Thus u ≤ j1 or u ≤ j2; without loss of
generality, let u ≤ j1. We need to show u ∨ j2 exists.
If u ∨ j2 does not exist then
Ku(P ) = Kj1(P ) and Ku(P ) = Kj1(P ),
hence CDN implies j1 ≤ f(P ). Consider P ′′′ ∈ Xn such that {P ′′′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0}
where
Kj1(P
′′′) = Kj2(P ),
Kj2(P
′′′) = Kj1(P ),
and K0(P
′′′) = K0(P ).
It was assumed that |Kj1(P )| = |Kj2(P )|, hence, we have that P ′′′ is simply a
permutation of the elements of P , thus, A implies j1 ≤ f(P ′′′). Observe that
Kj1(P ) = Kj2(P
′′′) and Kj1(P ) = Kj2(P
′′′).
Since j1 ≤ f(P ) it follows from CDN that j2 ≤ f(P ′′′). But now f(P ′′′) is an upper
bound for {j1, j2}, contrary to the fact that j1∨j2 does not exist. Thus u∨j2 exists,
as desired.
The last lemma utilized all the axioms to arrive at a proof. With these
lemmas established, we can complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that f(P0) = 0 or f(P0) = 1.
If f(P0) = 1 then consider P ∈ Xn such that P 6= P0. Observe that for
any j ∈ J we have Kj(P0) = ∅, thus Kj(P0) ⊆ Kj(P ). If f(P0) = 1 then
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Kj(P0) = Kj(P ) = ∅. Furthermore, if f(P0) = 1, then j ≤ f(P0). Thus, by
MON, j ≤ f(P ). Since j is an arbitrary element of J , this implies t ≤ f(P ) ∀t ∈ J ,
hence f(P ) = 1. Thus, in this case, f = fT .
If f 6= fT then f(P0) = 0, which is equal to fs(P0), since the join of the
empty set is 0. Suppose j ≤ f(P ) for some P ∈ Xn. Want to show j ≤ fs(P ).
Lemma 4.3 implies |Kj(P )| > 0. If |Kj(P )| = 0 then we’re done.
If |Kj(P )| > 0 consider P ′ ∈ Xn and j′ ∈ J such that j ∨ j′ does not exist,
where
P ′(i) = j for i ∈ Kj(P ),
P ′(i) = j′ for i ∈ Kj(P ), and
P ′(i) = 0 otherwise.
Thus, Kj(P
′) = Kj(P ) and Kj(P ′) = Kj′(P ′) = Kj(P ), hence, CDN implies
j ≤ f(P ′). This implies
|Kj(P ′)| > |Kj(P ′)| = |Kj′(P ′)|.
If not (that is, if |Kj(P ′)| ≤ |Kj′(P ′)|) then consider {P ′′} ⊆ {j, j′, 0} ∈ Xn such
that
Kj(P
′) ⊆ Kj(P ′′),
Kj(P
′′) ⊆ Kj(P ′), and
|Kj′(P ′′)| = |Kj(P ′′)|.
Thus, MON implies j ≤ f(P ′′). Lemma 4.5 implies
f(P ′′) =
∨
{t ∈ J : t ≤ j and t ∨ j′ exists
or t ≤ j′ and t ∨ j exists}.
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Since j ≤ f(P ′′) and j is join prime, we know that j ≤ t such that either
t ≤ j and t ∨ j′ exists⇒ j ∨ j′ exists, or
t ≤ j′ and t ∨ j exists⇒ j ∨ j′ exists.
Both cases contradict the assumption that j ∨ j′ does not exist. Hence, |Kj(P ′)| >
|Kj′(P ′)|. Thus, by the definition of fs, |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )| ⇒ j ≤ fs(P ).
Now we will assue j ≤ fs(P ) and show j ≤ f(P ). Lemma 4.1 implies
|Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|. If |Kj(P )| = 0 then consider P ′ ⊆ {j, 0} such that Kj(P ′) =
Kj(P ). Lemma 4.4 implies j ≤ f(P ′) hence, by CDN, j ≤ f(P ). If |Kj(P )| > 0
then there exists j′ ∈ J such that j∨ j′ does not exist. Consider P ′ ⊆ {j, j′, 0} with
Kj′(P
′) = Kj(P ), Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P ), and |Kj(P ′)| = |Kj′(P ′)|.
Thus, by Lemma 4.5,
f(P ′) =
∨
{t ∈ J : t ≤ j and t ∨ j′ exists
or t ≤ j′ and t ∨ j exists}.
If j ≤ f(P ′) then, since j is a join irreducible, we know that j ≤ t such that either
t ≤ j and t ∨ j′ exists⇒ j ∨ j′ exists, or
t ≤ j′ and t ∨ j exists⇒ j ∨ j′ exists.
Both cases contradict the fact that j∨ j′ does not exist, hence j  f(P ′). Similarly,
j′  f(P ′). Consider P ′′ ⊆ {j, j′, 0} where
Kj′(P
′′) = Kj′(P ′), Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P ′′), and |Kj(P ′′)| = |Kj(P ′)|+ 1.
Observe that P ′(ae)P ′′. Since j  f(P ′) and j′  f(P ′), TB tells us that either
j ≤ f(P ′′) or j′ ≤ f(P ′′). Since Kj′(P ′′) ⊆ Kj′(P ′) and Kj′(P ′) ⊆ Kj′(P ′′), if
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j′ ≤ f(P ′′) then MON would imply j′ ≤ f(P ′); a contradiction. Hence, j ≤ f(P ′′)
and we can use A and MON to get j ≤ f(P ).
Since j ≤ f(P )⇒ j ≤ fs(P ) and j ≤ fs(P )⇒ j ≤ f(P ), we have f = fs as
desired.
It is obviously the case that fT only makes sense as a function when X is a
lattice, thus when X is not a lattice A, CDN, MON, and TB uniquely characterize
the simple majority rule function fs. Since we would like a unique characterization
on any finite median semilattice X, the case when X is a lattice will require some
further study; which is done in the following sections. It will be shown in the
next section that, when X is a lattice, A is implied by the other axioms. To see
the importance of Anonymity when X is not a lattice we will look at a particular
consensus function that uses the following notation.
|Kj(P )|1 =
 |Kj(P )|+ 1 if j ≤ P (1);|Kj(P )| if j 6≤ P (1);
|Kj(P )|1 =
 |Kj(P )|+ 1 if j ∨ P (1) D.N.E.;|Kj(P )| otherwise.
Example 4.1. Let the function f̂s : X
n → X be defined by:
f̂s(P ) =
∨
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )|1 > |Kj(P )|1}.
This function satisfies MON, CDN, and TB, but not A. This function can
be thought of as simple majority rule only the first voters vote is counted twice. The
argument for f̂s satisfying MON, CDN, and TB is very similar to the argument
for fs satisfying those same axioms. To see that f̂s does not satisfy A, consider
P = (x1, x2, 0, . . . , 0) and P
′ = (x2, x1, 0, . . . , 0), where x1 ∨ x2 does not exist; such
an x1 and x2 can be found because X is not a lattice.
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It turns out (as we would hope) that when X is not a lattice, all of our axioms
are independent of one another. The function presented above demonstrates the
independence of Anonymity; below, functions will be presented which demonstrate
the independence of the remaining three axioms.
Example 4.2. The function fj∗ : X
n → X where X is any finite median semilattice
besides the two element chain, and j∗ ∈ J a fixed atom, is defined by:
fj∗(P ) =
 fs(P ) ∨ j
∗ if Kj∗(P ) = ∅
fs(P ) otherwise.
Since fs is a well defined function all we have to check to make sure fj∗ is
well defined is that fs(P ) ∨ j∗ exists when Kj∗(P ) = ∅. If fs(P ) = 0, then it is
clearly the case that fs(P ) ∨ j∗ exists. If fs(P ) 6= 0 then observe that since X is
finite, we know fs(P ) =
∨{j ∈ J : j ≤ fs(P )}. Recall that fs satisfies all the
axioms and that fs(P0) = 0, thus we can apply Lemma 4.3 and conclude that for
any j ∈ J , if j ≤ fs(P ) then Kj(P ) 6= ∅, thus there exists an i ∈ N such that
j ≤ P (i). Since Kj∗(P ) = ∅ we have that P (i) ∨ j∗ exists, and is thus an upper
bound for both j∗ and any j ∈ J such that j ≤ fs(P ), hence, j ∨ j∗ exists. If
|{j ∈ J : j ≤ fs(P )}| = 1 then {j ∈ J : j ≤ fs(P )} = {fs(P )} and we have that
fs(P ) ∨ j∗ exists. If |{j ∈ J : j ≤ fs(P )}| ≥ 2 then the join-Helly property implies
fs(P ) ∨ j∗ exists. Thus the function fj∗ is well defined, it is also the case that fj∗
satisfies A, MON, and TB, but not CDN.
It follows from the fact that fs satisfies A that fj∗ does as well. The fact that
fs satisfies TB and the observation that fs(P ) ≤ fj∗(P ) for all profiles P ∈ Xn,
that fj∗ satisfies TB as well. To see that fj∗ satisfies MON, consider P, P
′ ∈ Xn
such that Kj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′), Kj(P ′) ⊆ Kj(P ), and j ≤ fj∗(P ) for some j ∈ J .
We want to show j ≤ fj∗(P ′). Since j∗ is an atom, it follows that j ≤ fj∗(P )
implies j ≤ fs(P ) or j = j∗ (with Kj∗(P ) = ∅). If j ≤ fs(P ) then j ≤ fs(P ′)
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since fs satisfies MON, and thus j ≤ fj∗(P ′). If j = j∗ and Kj∗(P ) = ∅ then
Kj(P
′) ⊆ Kj(P ) implies Kj∗(P ′) = ∅ and we have fj∗(P ) = fs(P ) ∨ j∗, thus
j ≤ fj∗(P ′) as desired. To see that fj∗ does not satisfy CDN consider any j ∈ J
such that j 6= j∗; j∗ ≤ fj∗(P0) but j  fj∗(P0) even though the conditions of CDN
are met at P0.
Example 4.3. Let the function f0 : X
n → X be defined by:
f0(P ) = 0
This function satisfies A, CDN, and MON but not TB. This function
clearly satisfies A. f0 vacuously satisfies CDN and MON. Since this function
always outputs a 0 the tie can never be broken.
We will see an example of a function that satisfes A, CDN, TB, but not
MON in Chapter 5.
4.4 Lattice Case
It was mentioned in the preceding sections that things simplify quite a bit
when X is a lattice. In this section X will be restricted to being a distributive
lattice in order to study these simplifications. Just as we previously defined the
profile {P0} = {0}, it will be convenient to define {P1} = {1}, which is a potential
profile now that X is a lattice. We begin with the axioms of Monotonicity and
Competitive Decisive Neutrality, which reduce to axioms studied by Monjardet in
[19]; these axioms, Decisive Monotonicity and Decisive Neutrality respectively, are
presented below.
Axiom 4.5. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Decisive Monotonicity
(DM) if, for any P, P ′ ∈ Xn and any j ∈ J ; if Kj(P ) ⊆ Kj(P ′) then j ≤ f(P )⇒
j ≤ f(P ′).
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When X is a lattice and P ∈ Xn is a profile, then Kj(P ) = ∅ for all
j ∈ J . One way of looking at this is that MON isn’t actually changed, but that
the condition requiring Kj(P
′) ⊆ Kj(P ) is vacuously satisfied by all profiles P and
P ′ ∈ Xn.
Axiom 4.6. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Decisive Neutrality
(DN) if, for any P, P ′ ∈ Xn and any j, j′ ∈ J ;
Kj(P ) = Kj′(P
′) ⇒ [j ≤ f(P )⇔ j′ ≤ f(P ′)].
As with MON, the requirement that Kj(P ) = Kj′(P
′) is vacuously satisfied
by all profiles when X is a lattice.
RestrictingX to being a lattice does not change the presentation of Anonymity
or Tie Breaking, however, when X is a lattice DM, DN, and TB imply Anonymity.
Theorem 4.4. If X is a distributive lattice and f : Xn → X satisfies DM, DN,
and TB then f satisfies A.
Proof. Since X is a lattice, DM and DN are equivalent to MON and CDN. Thus,
it follows from Lemma 4.2 that f(P0) = 0 or f(P0) = 1. It follows from the same
argument given in the proof of Theorem 4.3 that if f(P0) = 1 then f(P ) = 1 for
all P ∈ Xn, thus, since f is constant, it clearly satisfies Anonymity. If f(P0) = 0
consider P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that P ′ = σP for some permutation σ and j ≤ f(P ) for
some j ∈ J . Lemma 4.3 implies Kj(P ) 6= ∅ thus Kj(P ′) 6= ∅. Consider P ′′ ∈ Xn
such that {P ′′} ⊆ {j, 0} and Kj(P ′′) = Kj(P ′). Lemma 4.4 implies j ≤ f(P ′′) and
DM implies j ≤ f(P ′). Since f(P ) = ∨{j : j ≤ f(P ) and j ∈ J}, it follows that
f(P ) ≤ f(P ′). An argument symmetric to the one just presented can be used to
show f(P ′) ≤ f(P ), thus f(P ) = f(P ′) as desired.
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This interesting result allows us to remove the axiom of Anonymity from
Theorem 4.3 when X is a lattice. This result is presented below as a corollary.
Corollary 1. If X is a distributive lattice and f : Xn → X is a consensus function
that satisfies DM, DN, and TB then f = fs or f = fT .
To see that A is the only axiom implied by the others we can consider the
following examples of consensus functions that satisfy all but one of the remaining
axioms.
In the following example let X = B2, the Boolean lattice with two atoms,
pictured in Figure 4.1.





Define the function f1 : X
n → X by:
f1(P ) = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ . . . ∧ xn ∀P = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn.
We now show that the function f1 satisfies DM and DN, but not TB. Since
j ≤ f1(P ) if and only if Kj(P ) = {1, . . . , n}, for any j ∈ J and P ∈ Xn, DM
is vacuously satisfied. To see that DN is satisfied, consider P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that
Kj(P ) = Kj′(P
′) for some j, j′ ∈ J and j ≤ f1(P ). This implies Kj(P ) = N thus
{P ′} = Kj′(P ′) and it follows that j′ ≤ f1(P ′). To see that TB is not satisfied,
consider P0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and P = (a1, 0, . . . , 0). It follows from the definition of
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f1 that f1(P0) = f1(P ) = 0, hence the tie is not broken.
The next example function is defined on the chain with two join irreducibles,
a and 1, pictured in Figure 4.2.





The following function satisfies Decisive Monotonicity and Tie-Breaking, but
not Decisive Neutrality. Define f2 : X
n → X by:
f2(P ) =
 x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn if P 6= P0a if P = P0.
To see that this function satisfies DM observe that, when j = a, DM is
satisfied automatically; if j = 1 then 1 ≤ f2(P ) implies P (i) = 1 for some i ∈ K,
thus K1(P ) ⊆ K1(P ′) implies P ′(i) = 1 for some i ∈ K, thus 1 ≤ f2(P ′). A similar
argument illustrates that f2 satisfies TB, since a ≤ f2(P ) for all profiles P the
only case we need to consider is when j = j′ = 1. If 1  f2(P ) for some P such
that {P} ⊆ {0, 1} then we know P = P0. Thus, P (ae)P ′ implies P ′(i) = 1 for
some i ∈ K, hence, 1 ≤ f2(P ′) and f2 satisfies TB. Lastly, consider P = P0 and
P ′ = (a, 0, . . . , 0), Ka(P ) = K1(P ′) = ∅ and a ≤ f2(P ) but 1  f2(P ′), thus f2
does not satisfy DN.
For the last example, consider the two element chain seen in Figure 4.3.
Define f3 : X
n → X as:
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 x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn if P 6= P10 if P = P1.
The function f3 satisfies Decisive Neutrality and Tie-Breaking, but not De-
cisive Monotonicity. To see that it satisfies DN consider the fact that 1 is the only
join irreducible and X consists of only two elements, so K1(P ) = K1(P
′) implies
P = P ′ for all profiles P, P ′ ∈ Xn, thus 1 ≤ f3(P )⇔ 1 ≤ f3(P ′), so DN is satisfied.
To see that f3 satisfies TB observe that 1  f3(P ) implies P = P0 or P = P1,
in either case if P (ae)P ′ then 1 ≤ f3(P ′). The function f3 does not satisfy DM,
which can be seen by considering the profiles P = (0, 1, . . . , 1) and P ′ = P1, thus
K1(P ) ⊆ K1(P ′), however, 1 ≤ f3(P ) but 1  f3(P ′).
Thus DN, DM, and TB are independent of one another. Since the lattices
in the preceeding examples are also all finite median semilattices, these functions
demonstrate the independence of CDN, MON, and TB when X is any finite
median semilattice. Combined with the example at the end of the previous section,
we can see that all the axioms in Theorem 4.3 are independent of one another.
4.5 Unanimity
To get the unique characterization that we want we will need to further
restrict what functions we are describing. Following is the definition of another
common axiom from voting theory, unanimity.
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Axiom 4.7. A consensus function f : Xn → X satisfies Unanimity (U) if, for
any P ∈ Xn and x ∈ X such that P = (x, . . . , x), then f(P ) = x.
Thus, if a profile indicates that all the individuals favor the same alternative,
a unanimous function will select that alternative as the output.
Lemma 4.6. The simple majority rule function fs satisfies Unanimity.
Proof. Let X be a finite median semilattice. Let P ∈ Xn be a profile such that
{P} = {x} for some x ∈ X. Recall that fs is defined as:
fs(P ) =
∨
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|}.
Since Kj(P ) = {i ∈ N : j ≤ P (i)} and Kj(P ) = {i ∈ N : j ∨ P (i) D.N.E.}, we
know that if j ∈ J and j ≤ x then Kj(P ) = N and Kj(P ) = ∅, thus |Kj(P )| >
|Kj(P )| and we have j ∈ {j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|}. If j ∈ J and j  x then
Kj(P ) = ∅, thus |Kj(P )| = 0 and we have j /∈ {j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|}. Hence
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|} = {j ∈ J : j ≤ x}. It follows from this that
∨
{j ∈ J : |Kj(P )| > |Kj(P )|} =
∨
{j ∈ J : j ≤ x}
but we know X is finite, so
∨{j ∈ J : j ≤ x} = x; thus fs(P ) = x.
It is worth remarking at this point that our other important example of a
consensus function, the top function fT , does not satisfy unanimity. To see this,
consider fT (P0). The profile P0 = (0, . . . , 0), thus {P0} = {0} but fT (P0) = 1.
Just as it turned out that restricting X to being a lattice caused Anonymity
to be implied by the other axioms, adding Unanimity makes Decisive Neutrality
redundant when X is a lattice.
Theorem 4.5. If X is a distributive lattice and f : Xn → X satisfies U, DM, and
TB then f satisfies DN.
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Proof. Consider P, P ′ ∈ Xn such that Kj(P ) = Kj′(P ′) for some j, j′ ∈ J where
j ≤ f(P ). We want to show j′ ≤ f(P ′). Observe that U implies f(P0) = 0,
satisfying the conditions of Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4; hence, by Lemma 4.3, Kj(P ) 6= ∅.
Since Kj(P ) = Kj′(P
′) there is some i ∈ N such that i ∈ Kj′(P ′). Consider
P ′′ ∈ Xn such that P ′′(i) = j′ and P ′′(k) = 0 for k 6= i. It follows from Lemma 4.4
that j′ ≤ f(P ′′). Since Kj′(P ′′) ⊆ Kj′(P ′), DM implies j′ ≤ f(P ′) as desired.
Theorem 4.6. Let X be a finite median semilattice and let f : Xn → X.
(a) If X is not a lattice, then f satisfies A, CDN, MON, and TB iff f = fs.
(b) If X is a lattice, then f satisfies U, DM, and TB iff f = fs.
Proof. If X is a finite median semilattice that is not a lattice and f : Xn → X is a
consensus function satisfying A, CDN, MON, and TB, then Theorem 4.3 implies
f = fs or f = fT . Since X is not a lattice, then it cannot be the case that f = fT
since this function is only defined on a lattice, thus f = fs. If f = fs then it follows
from Theorem 4.1 that f satisfies A, CDN, MON, and TB.
If X is a finite median semilattice that is a lattice and f : Xn → X is a
consensus function satisfying U, DM, and TB, then Theorem 4.5 implies f satisfies
DN as well. Thus Corollary 1 implies f = fs or f = fT , but since f also satisfies U
then it cannot be the case that f = fT since we saw above that fT does not satisfy
Unanimity, thus f = fs. If f = fs then it follows from Theorem 4.1 and Lemma
4.6 that f satisfies U, DN, DM, and TB.
To summarize, if X is a finite median semilattice and we know whether or not
it is a lattice, then we can uniquely characterize the simple majority rule function
with four axioms or less. Monotonicity, and Tie-Breaking are required for either
case; Unanimity if X is a lattice, Anonymity and Competitive Decisive Neutrality
if X is not a lattice. If X is a general finite median semilattice then all five are
required for a unique characterization of fs.
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CHAPTER 5
MAY’S THEOREM ON HIERARCHIES
The true power of Theorem 4.3 can be seen by looking at a particular example
of a median semilattice. In this chapter the median semilattice of hierarchies is
considered. We will see that the characterization of simple majority rule given in
Chapter 4 can be applied to the median semilattice of hierarchies to obtain a version
of May’s Theorem on hierarchies.
Definition 5.1. A hierarchy H, on a finite set S of size n ≥ 3, is a collection of
subsets of S such that
• ∅ 6∈ H and S ∈ H;
• {x} ∈ H for all x ∈ S;
• A ∩B ∈ {A,B,∅} for all A,B ∈ H.
The application of the hierarchy concept in the field of clustering is illustrated
in [13]. An element of a hierarchy is called a cluster; in particular, a cluster A ∈ H
is a nontrivial cluster if 1 < |A| < n, whereas A is a trivial cluster if it is a
singleton subset of S or the entire set S. Let
H∅ = {{x}, S : x ∈ S} and HA = H∅ ∪ {A}.
In Figure 5.1, the hierarchy H{a,b,c} with S = {a, b, c, d} is shown. Notice that H∅
is a hierarchy on S containing only the trivial clusters and HA is a hierarchy on S
containing a single nontrivial cluster, A. For any two hierarchies H and J on S, we
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{a} {b} {c} {d}
{a, b, c}
S
Figure 5.1: The hierarchy H{a,b,c}
say H ≤ J if H ⊆ J . It is easy to check that ≤ is a partial order on the set of all
hierarchies. The first two items in the definition of a hierarchy H are equivalent to
H∅ ≤ H.
We denote the set of all hierarchies on a set S by H(S), or just H when the
set S is understood from context.
Proposition 5.1. The pair (H(S),≤) is a median semilattice.
Proof. By the definition of hierarchy,
H∅ ≤ H ∀H ∈ H(S)
Next, for any H,H ′ ∈ H(S), we have H∅ ≤ H ∩ H ′. For any nontrivial clusters
A,B ∈ H ∩ H ′ we know A,B ∈ H, since H ∩ H ′ is a subset of H. Since H is a
hierarchy, we know A ∩B ∈ {A,B,∅}, hence,
H ∩H ′ ∈ H(S).
So (H(S),≤) is a meet semilattice with set intersection as the meet operation.
Let H ∈ H(S) and consider the set
{J ∈ H(S) : J ≤ H}.
Because we are considering only hierarchies that are subsets of a fixed hierarchy,
this set is a lattice with intersection as meet and union as join. Since intersection
distributes over union and vice versa, it follows that this lattice is distributive.
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Let H,H ′, H ′′ ∈ H(S) such that
H ∪H ′, H ∪H ′′, H ′ ∪H ′′ ∈ H(S).
Now consider H ∪ H ′ ∪ H ′′. As before, H∅ ≤ H ∪ H ′ ∪ H ′′. For any nontrivial
clusters A,B ∈ H ∪ H ′ ∪ H ′′ it follows that A is in one of H, H ′, or H ′′; likewise
with B. Since each of H, H ′, and H ′′ is a hierarchy, as well as each of their pairwise
unions, we have A∩B ∈ {A,B,∅}, so H ∪H ′ ∪H ′′ ∈ H(S) and H(S) satisfies the
join-Helly property. Thus, H(S) is a median semilattice.
As one might expect, the set of all hierarches on a gives set grows large very
quickly as the size of the base set increases. For a diagram of the median semilattice
derived from the set of all hierarchies on a set of size 4, see [5]. It will also be useful
to be able to talk about the join irreducible elements of the median semilattice
H(S), this prompts the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2. For any median semilattice H(S),
(a) If A is a nontrivial subset of S, then HA is a join irreducible element of H(S).
(b) If J is a join irreducible element of H(S), then J = HA for some nontrivial
subset A.
Proof. (a) Suppose HA = J ∪ J ′, where J, J ′ ∈ H(S). Without loss of generality
we can assume A ∈ J . We also know H∅ ∈ J thus HA ⊆ J . it is clearly the case
that J ⊆ J ∪ J ′ = HA hence J = HA.
(b) Suppose J is a join irreducible element of H(S). This implies J 6= H∅,
thus there exists some non trivial subset A such that A ∈ J . Now suppose there
exists some non trivial subset B ∈ J such that A 6= B, then we can say J =
HA ∪ (J \ A), contradicting the assumption that J is a join irreducible. Thus
J = HA.
57
If we let K = {1, . . . , k} be a set of individuals, then a function of the form
f : Hk → H
is called a consensus function, and a k-tuple P = (H1, . . . , Hk) ∈ Hk in the
domain of f is called a profile. Here k ≥ 2 is the length of a profile. For any
P = (H1, . . . , Hk) ∈ Hk, let {P} = {H ∈ H : H = Hi for some i ∈ K}. For any
profile P and any cluster A let
KA(P ) = {i ∈ K : A ∈ Hi} and KA(P ) = {i ∈ K : Hi ∪ {A} 6∈ H}.
The majority rule consensus function Maj : Hk → H is defined by
Maj(P ) =
{




A simple pigeonhole argument shows that Maj is well defined [15]. The simple
majority rule consensus function Maj+ : Hk → H is defined by
Maj+(P ) = {A : |KA(P )| > |KA(P )|}.




why we use the notation Maj+.
Presented below are the axioms used in Theorem 4.3 but explicitly expressed
for hierarchies.
Axiom 5.1. A function f : Hk → H satisfies anonymity (A) if, for any permu-
tation σ of K = {1, . . . , k}, we have f(P ) = f(σP ), where σP = (Hσ(1), . . . , Hσ(n)).
Axiom 5.2. A function f : Hk → H satisfies competitive decisive neutrality
(CDN) if, for any P, P ′ ∈ Hk and any nontrivial clusters A and B;
KA(P ) = KB(P
′) and KA(P ) = KB(P ′)⇒ [A ∈ f(P )⇔ B ∈ f(P ′)].
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Axiom 5.3. A function f : Hk → H satisfies monotonicity (MON) if, for any
P, P ′ ∈ Hk and any nontrivial cluster A; if KA(P ) ⊆ KA(P ′) and KA(P ′) ⊆ KA(P )
then A ∈ f(P )⇒ A ∈ f(P ′).
The two functions mentioned above, Maj and Maj+, satisfy all of these
axioms. They differ in that Maj+ satisfies the following axiom of tie breaking,
whereas Maj does not.
Definition 5.2. Two profiles P = (H1, . . . , Hk) and P
′ = (H ′1, . . . , H
′
k) are almost
equal, denoted P (ae)P ′, if there exists i0 ∈ K such that Hi = H ′i for all i 6= i0 and
Hi0 6= H ′i0.
Axiom 5.4. A function f : Hk → H satisfies tie breaking (TB) if, for every
P, P ′ ∈ Hk and nontrivial clusters A and B such that
{P} ∪ {P ′} ⊆ {HA, HB, H∅}
and P (ae)P ′
we have
A 6∈ f(P ) and B 6∈ f(P )⇒ A ∈ f(P ′) or B ∈ f(P ′).
Theorem 5.1. A consensus function F : Hk → H satisfies Anonymity, Competitive
Decisive Neutrality, Monotonicity, and Tie Breaking if and only if F = Maj+.
Proof. We saw in Proposition 5.1 that (H(S),≤) is a median semilattice, moreover,
because |S| ≥ 3 it is easy to see that (H(S),≤) is not a lattice. Since the axioms
above are equivalent to those in Theorem 4.3, we get that Theorem 5.1 follows from
Theorem 4.3, Proposition 5.1, and the observation that H is not a lattice.
The Maj+ function has been characterized before [7], but this characteriza-
tion highlights the parallels between Maj+ and fs by using extensions of the axioms
originally used by May to characterize simple majority rule. We can see that all
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the axioms are independent of one another by considering the following examples of
consensus functions that satisfy all but one of the axioms. The first example uses a
unique notation defined as follows:
|KA(P )|1 =
 |KA(P )|+ 1 if A ∈ H1;|KA(P )| if A 6∈ H1;
|KA(P )|1 =
 |KA(P )|+ 1 if {A} ∪H1 6∈ H;|KA(P )| if {A} ∪H1 ∈ H.
Example 5.1. The function f1 : Hk → H defined by
f1(P ) = {A : |KA(P )|1 > |KA(P )|1}
satisfies CDN, MON, TB, but not A. Since we can think of f1 as Maj
+ on profiles
of length k + 1, f1 is well-defined.
Example 5.2. The function L : Hk → H defined by
L(P ) = Maj(P ) ∪ {X : |KX(P )| > 0 and |KX(P ) = 0}
satisfies A, CDN, MON, but not TB. L(P ) is the “loose consensus function” [18].
Recall that Maj also satisfies A, CDN, MON, but not TB.
Example 5.3. The function NU : Hk → H, with k ≥ 3, defined by
NU(P ) = H∅ ∪ {X : k > |KX(P )| > |KX(P )|}
satisfies A, CDN, TB, but not MON.




+(P ) ∪HA if KA(P ) = ∅
Maj+(P ) otherwise.
satisfies A, MON, TB, but not CDN.
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Using the fact that the collection of all hierarchies on a given set forms a
median semilattice, we were able to offer a new characterization of Maj+ that is
essentially a corollary of Theorem 4.3. In this way, we can see that Maj+ truly is
May’s simple majority rule on hierarchies.
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CHAPTER 6
APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Applications
A direct application of the main result to the field of hierarchical clustering
was presented in Chapter 5. Now we will discuss an idea on how to apply the main
result to the area of social science. Most governments have some notion of what
is called a “bill.” This bill is what the representatives in the legislature create,
discuss, debate, revise, harangue, and ultimately vote upon; the outcome of said
vote determining whether or not the bill becomes a law.
The process of creating a law is lengthy, partly because each bill is a lengthy
document composed of many component parts. No one single law is getting voted on
in a typical bill, instead each bill addresses numerous issues and is full of numerous
provisions, provisos, addendums, and amendments that are added, removed, and
modified during the revision process in the attempt to create a law that will get a
majority approval.
If we consider each of the component parts that any particular law maker
might like to see in a bill as separate entities, then we can look at every possible
combination of those parts as a distinct variation of the bill. Since all we are really
considering here is some subset of the set of all possible combinations of these
components, we can think of each possible bill as an element in a partially ordered
set with union and intersection as the join and meet operations, respectively. It
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would inherit it’s distibutive property from the power set lattice on which it is
based. It is possible that this structure is a distributive lattice or, more generally,
a median semilattice. So we could apply our main result to this situation as a way
of designing a bill; each representative would vote for the version of the bill they
found most agreeable and the output would be a new version of the bill that has
the most overall approval. This relatively simplistic idea can be readily applied to
almost any situation where people are trying to chose a subset from among a larger
set of alternatives.
6.2 Future Work
In the case with two alternatives, the simple majority rule function is uniquely
determined by anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness. It has been
demonstrated that anonymity and positive responsiveness alone characterize a larger
class of functions based on the idea of strong quota pair systems. A more ambitious
yet worthwhile endeavor would be to fully characterize the class of functions satis-
fying any combination of these axioms, comparing these results would undoubtedly
shed insight into the nature and restrictiveness of each condition.
It has also been demonstrated that the simple majority rule function can be
characterized on finite median semilattices, yielding a true generalization of May’s
Theorem to an order theoretic domain. What is not yet known is how the notion
of strong quota pair systems could be generalized to the domain of finite median
semilattices or what this class of functions would look like.
Finally, the generalization of May’s theorem on median semilattices could
be pushed further. The concept of medain semilattices is very closely related to
that of median graphs, an undirected graph where each set of three vertices has
a unique vertex belonging to the shortest paths between each pair of the three
63
vertices. Translating the axioms and theorems presented in this dissertation to the
realm of graph theory is a more than feasible task and the result would be a further
generalization of May’s theorem to the realm of graph theory.
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